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Attribute-Based Storage Supporting Secure
Deduplication of Encrypted Data in Cloud
Hui Cui, Robert H. Deng, Yingjiu Li, and Guowei Wu
Abstract—Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been widely used in cloud computing where a data provider outsources his/her
encrypted data to a cloud service provider, and can share the data with users possessing specific credentials (or attributes). However,
the standard ABE system does not support secure deduplication, which is crucial for eliminating duplicate copies of identical data in
order to save storage space and network bandwidth. In this paper, we present an attribute-based storage system with secure
deduplication in a hybrid cloud setting, where a private cloud is responsible for duplicate detection and a public cloud manages the
storage. Compared with the prior data deduplication systems, our system has two advantages. Firstly, it can be used to confidentially
share data with users by specifying access policies rather than sharing decryption keys. Secondly, it achieves the standard notion of
semantic security for data confidentiality while existing systems only achieve it by defining a weaker security notion. In addition, we put
forth a methodology to modify a ciphertext over one access policy into ciphertexts of the same plaintext but under other access policies
without revealing the underlying plaintext.
Index Terms—ABE, Storage, Deduplication.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing greatly facilitates data providers who
want to outsource their data to the cloud without disclosing
their sensitive data to external parties and would like users
with certain credentials to be able to access the data [1],
[2], [3], [4], [5]. This requires data to be stored in encrypted
forms with access control policies such that no one except
users with attributes (or credentials) of specific forms can
decrypt the encrypted data. An encryption technique that
meets this requirement is called attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [6], where a user’s private key is associated with an
attribute set, a message is encrypted under an access policy
(or access structure) over a set of attributes, and a user can
decrypt a ciphertext with his/her private key if his/her
set of attributes satisfies the access policy associated with
this ciphertext. However, the standard ABE system fails to
achieve secure deduplication [7], which is a technique to
save storage space and network bandwidth by eliminating
redundant copies of the encrypted data stored in the cloud.
On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, existing
constructions [8], [9], [10], [11] for secure deduplication are
not built on attribute-based encryption. Nevertheless, since
ABE and secure deduplication have been widely applied in
cloud computing, it would be desirable to design a cloud
storage system possessing both properties.
We consider the following scenario in the design of an
attribute-based storage system supporting secure dedupli-
cation of encrypted data in the cloud, in which the cloud
will not store a file more than once even though it may
receive multiple copies of the same file encrypted under
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different access policies. A data provider, Bob, intends to
upload a fileM to the cloud, and shareM with users having
certain credentials. In order to do so, Bob encrypts M under
an access policy A over a set of attributes, and uploads
the corresponding ciphertext to the cloud, such that only
users whose sets of attributes satisfying the access policy
can decrypt the ciphertext. Later, another data provider,
Alice, uploads a ciphertext for the same underlying file M
but ascribed to a different access policy A′. Since the file
is uploaded in an encrypted form, the cloud is not able to
discern that the plaintext corresponding to Alice’s ciphertext
is the same as that corresponding to Bob’s, and will store
M twice. Obviously, such duplicated storage wastes storage
space and communication bandwidth.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we present an attribute-based storage system
which employs ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) and supports secure deduplication. Our main
contributions can be summarized as follows.
• Firstly, the system is the first that achieves the stan-
dard notion of semantic security for data confiden-
tiality in attribute-based deduplication systems by
resorting to the hybrid cloud architecture [12].
• Secondly, we put forth a methodology to modify
a ciphertext over one access policy into ciphertexts
of the same plaintext but under any other access
policies without revealing the underlying plaintext.
This technique might be of independent interest in
addition to the application in the proposed storage
system.
• Thirdly, we propose an approach based on two cryp-
tographic primitives, including a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge [13] and a commitment scheme
[14], to achieve data consistency in the system.
Published in IEEE Transactions on Big Data, 2017 January
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In a typical storage system with secure deduplication
(e.g., [9]), to store a file in the cloud, a data provider
generates a tag and a ciphertext. The data provider uploads
the tag and the ciphertext to the cloud. Upon receiving an
outsourcing request from a data provider for uploading a
ciphertext and an associated tag, the cloud runs a so-called
equality checking algorithm, which checks if the tag in the
incoming request is identical to any tags in the storage
system. If there is a match, then the underlying plaintext
of this incoming ciphertext has already been stored and the
new ciphertext is discarded. It is apparent that such a system
with a tag appended to the ciphertext does not provide the
standard notion of semantic security for data confidentiality
[15], because if the plaintexts can be predicated from their
tags, an adversary can always make a correct guess by
computing the tag of a plaintext and then testing it against
the tag in the challenge phase in the semantic security game.
To circumvent this obstacle, we bring in our system a hybrid
cloud architecture [12], which consists of a private cloud re-
sponsible for tag checking and ciphertext regeneration (to be
introduced later) and a public cloud storing the ciphertexts.
Thanks to this architecture, we manage to achieve semantic
security with respect to the public cloud, whilst in terms of
the private cloud, a weaker security notion called privacy
under chosen distribution attacks (PRV-CDA security) [8] is
accomplished under the assumption that the message space
is sufficiently large such that each message to be uploaded
to the cloud is unpredictable.
However, endowing such a tag checking ability to the
private cloud is not sufficient to achieve deduplication in the
attribute-based storage system which employs CP-ABE for
data encryption. In the proposed attributed-based system,
the same file could be encrypted to different ciphertexts
associated with different access policies, storing only one
ciphertext of the file means that users whose attributes
satisfy the access policy of a discarded ciphertext (but not
that of the stored ciphertext) will be denied to access the
data that they are entitled to. To overcome this problem,
we equip the private cloud with another capability named
ciphertext regeneration. For a ciphertext c of a plaintext M
with access policy A, the private cloud will be provided with
a trapdoor key which is generated along with the ciphertext
c by a data provider. The private cloud can use the trapdoor
key to convert the ciphertext c with access policy A to a
new ciphertext C with another access policy A′ without
knowing the underlying message M . Thus, if two data
providers happen to upload two ciphertexts corresponding
to the same file but under different access policies A and
A′, the private cloud can regenerate a ciphertext for the
same underlying file with an access policy A ∪ A′1 using
the corresponding trapdoor key and then store the new
ciphertext instead of the old one in the public cloud.
Another key challenge in secure deduplication is to make
it secure against duplicate faking attacks [8] in which a
legally generated message is unnoticeably replaced by a
fake one. In such an attack, a malicious user may intercept
an outsourcing request and tamper with the ciphertext, and
then sending the modified ciphertext but the original tag to
1. For simplicity, A ∪ A′ is used to denote an access policy which
satisfies both A and A′.
the cloud. Later, an honest data provider wants to upload a
ciphertext for an identical file. The cloud spots that the tags
of the two ciphertexts match each other, and thus might
discard the ciphertext from the honest data provider and
keeps the maliciously modified ciphertext. When a user
downloads the ciphertext, a tampered message M ′ rather
than the correct M will be returned, which violates data
integrity. In order to address this problem, we require the
data provider to produce a proof of consistency reflecting
that the tag and the ciphertext are legitimately generated.
Our approach of producing such a proof makes use of the
randomness reuse technique in the generation of the tag
and the ciphertext with an additional zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge (PoK) [13] on the shared random coin in
the tag and the ciphertext. Therefore, it is impossible for
an adversary to perform duplicate faking attacks unless
the adversary casually obtains the content of the plaintext
hidden in the ciphertext.
Unfortunately, the above method only works for the
private cloud who is responsible for tag checking. It remains
challenging to achieve secure deduplication in the public
cloud. Since the public cloud is not involved in any compu-
tation or verification, it is indispensable to guarantee that its
stored ciphertexts are kept intact without any modification.
A straightforward way to achieve this is to save the tags
and the ciphertexts in pairs in the public cloud2, but if the
tag and the corresponding ciphertext are both known to the
public cloud, then as we mentioned before, it is impossible
to obtain semantic security. To achieve the standard security
notation for data confidentiality [15], we ask a data provider
to generate a label, in addition to the prior tag and cipher-
text, using a commitment scheme [14]. This label is bound to
the ciphertext and tag using the aforementioned PoK system
but reveals no information about the underlying plaintext
to the public cloud and users who are not entitled with the
decryption privilege, and will be outsourced to the public
cloud with the ciphertext instead of the tag, so that even
if an adversary who is aware of the data that an honest
data provider may upload, the duplicate faking attacks can
be detected by users who download and decrypt the data.
Note that because the label is stored by the private and
public clouds, the tampering behaviour to the label in the
public cloud will be immediately detected by the private
cloud. Therefore, a user having decryption privilege to the
ciphertext can always check the correctness of the plaintext
via the label since the tag and the label must be tied to the
same plaintext in terms of the proof.
1.2 Related Work
Attribute-Based Encryption. Sahai and Waters [6] intro-
duced the notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE), and
then Goyal et al. [16] formulated key-policy ABE (KP-ABE)
and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) as two complimentary
forms of ABE. The first KP-ABE construction given in [16]
realized the monotonic access structures, the first KP-ABE
system supporting the expression of non-monotone formu-
las was presented in [17] to enable more viable access poli-
2. In this way, any user who downloads the file, after decryption, can
check the correctness of the decrypted plaintext by matching it to the
corresponding tag.
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cies, and the first large class KP-ABE system was presented
by in the standard model in [18]. Nevertheless, we believe
that KP-ABE is less flexible than CP-ABE because the access
policy is determined once the user’s attribute private key
is issued. Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [19] proposed the
first CP-ABE construction, but it is secure under the generic
group model. Cheung and Newport [20] presented a CP-
ABE scheme that is proved to be secure under the standard
model, but it only supports the AND access structures. A
CP-ABE system under more advanced access structures is
proposed by Goyal et al. [21] based on the number theoretic
assumption. In order to overcome the limitation that the size
of the attribute space is polynomially bounded in the securi-
ty parameter and the attributes are fixed ahead, Rouselakis
and Waters [22] built a large universe CP-ABE system under
the prime-order group. In this paper, the Rouselakis-Waters
system is taken as the underlying scheme for the concrete
construction.
Secure Deduplication. With the goal of saving storage space
for cloud storage services, Douceur et al. [23] proposed
the first solution for balancing confidentiality and efficiency
in performing deduplication called convergent encryption,
where a message is encrypted under a message-derived
key so that identical plaintexts are encrypted to the same
ciphertexts. In this case, if two users upload the same file,
the cloud server can discern the equal ciphertexts and store
only one copy of them. Implementations and variants of
convergent encryption were deployed in [24], [25], [26], [27],
[28]. In order to formalize the precise security definition for
convergent encryption, Bellare, Keelveedhi and Ristenpart
[8] introduced a cryptographic primitive named message-
locked encryption, and detailed several definitions to cap-
ture various security requirements. Abadi et al. [9] then
strengthened the security definition in [8] by considering the
plaintext distributions depending on the public parameters
of the schemes. This model was later extended by Bellare
and Keelveedhi [11] by providing privacy for messages that
are both correlated and dependent on the public system pa-
rameters. Since message-locked encryption cannot resist to
brute-force attacks where files falling into a known set will
be recovered, an architecture that provides secure dedupli-
cated storage resisting brute-force attacks was put forward
by Keelveedhi, Bellare and Ristenpart [10] and realized in
a system called server-aided encryption for deduplicated
storage. In this paper, a similar technique to that in [9] is
used to achieve secure deduplication with regard to the
private cloud in the concrete construction.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we briefly review the notions and definitions to
be used in the paper. In Section 3, after depicting the ar-
chitecture for the attribute-based storage system supporting
secure deduplication, we present its security model. We give
a concrete attribute-based storage system supporting secure
deduplication and analyze its security and performance
efficiency in Section 4, and compare it with other related
works in the literature in Section 5. We conclude the paper
in Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some basic cryptographic notions
and definitions that are to be used later.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings and Complexity Assumptions
Suppose that Groupgen is a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm that inputs a security parameter λ, and outputs
a triplet (G, p, g) where G is a group of order p that is
generated from g, and p is a prime number. We define eˆ :
G × G → G1 to be a bilinear map if it has the following
properties [29].
• Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have
eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab.
• Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operation
in G is efficiently computable and there exists a group G1
and an efficiently computable bilinear map eˆ : G×G→ G1
as above.
Decisional (q − 1) Assumption [22]. The decisional (q − 1)
problem is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm, given −→y =
g, gµ,
ga
i
, gbj , gs·bj , ga
ibj , ga
i/b2j ∀ (i, j) ∈ [q, q],
ga
i/bj ∀ (i, j) ∈ [2q, q], i 6= q + 1,
ga
ibj/b
2
j′ ∀ (i, j, j′) ∈ [2q, q, q], j 6= j′,
gµa
ibj/bj′ , gµa
ibj/b
2
j′ ∀ (i, j, j′) ∈ [q, q, q], j 6= j′,
it is difficult to distinguish (−→y , eˆ(g, g)aq+1µ) from (−→y , Z),
where g ∈ G, Z ∈ G1, a, µ, b1, ..., bq ∈ Z∗p chosen
independently and uniformly at random.
2.2 Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption (SE) scheme SE with a key space K
and a message spaceM [30] is composed of two algorithms:
an encryption algorithm SE .Enc(K, m) which outputs a
ciphertext CT on input a key K ∈ K and a message m ∈M,
and a decryption algorithm SE .Dec(K, CT) which outputs
a message m or a failure symbol ⊥ on input a key K ∈ K
and a ciphertext CT.
Let st be the state information. A symmetric encryption
scheme SE is secure under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA secure), if for any PPT adversary A = (A1, A2), the
advantage function
AdvIND-CPASE,A (λ) =
Pr
b′ = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
K ← K; b← {0, 1}
(m0,m1, st)← A1(1λ)
CT∗ ← SE .Enc(K,mb)
b′ ← A2(par,m0,m1, st,CT∗)
− 1/2
is negligible in the security parameter λ, where |m0| = |m1|.
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2.3 Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme CME is composed of the following
three algorithms [14]: parameter generation algorithm CPG
which takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs the
public parameters cpars, committal algorithm Com which
takes the public parameters cpars and data x as input and
outputs a commitment com to x along with a decommittal
key dec, and deterministic verification algorithm Ver which
takes the public parameter cpars, data x, a commitment com
and a decommittal key dec as input and outputs 1 to indicate
that it accepts or 0 to indicate that it rejects.
A commitment scheme should be both binding which
means that the decommit phase can successfully open to
only one value, and hiding which means that the commit
phase does not reveal any information about x. For X ∈
{Hiding, Binding}, the advantages
AdvXCMT ,A(λ) = 2 · Pr[XACMT ⇒ true]− 1
referring to the games of the hiding and binding properties
in Fig. 1 are negligible in the security parameter λ.
2.4 Access Structures and Linear Secret Sharing
Schemes
We review the the notions of access structures and linear
secret sharing schemes in [31], [32] as follows.
Definition 1. (Access Structures). Let {P1, ..., Pn} be a set of
parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C :
if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ⊆ A. An (monotone) access
structure is a (monotone) collection A of non-empty subsets
of {P1, ..., Pn}, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} \ {∅}. The sets in A are
called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called
the unauthorized sets.
Definition 2. (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes). Let P be a
set of parties. Let M be a matrix of size l×n. Let ρ : {1, ..., l}
→ P be a function that maps a row to a party for labeling.
Let p be a prime number. A secret sharing scheme Π over a
set of parties P is a linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) over
Zp if
1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2) There exists a matrix M which has l rows and n
columns called the share-generating matrix for Π.
For i = 1, ..., l, the i-th row of matrix M is labeled
by a party ρ(i), where ρ : {1, ..., l} → P is a function
that maps a row to a party for labeling. Considering
that the column vector v = (µ, r2, ..., rn), where
s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2, ..., rn ∈
Zp are randomly chosen, then Mv is the vector of
l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share
(Mv)i belongs to party ρ(i).
It has been noted in [31] that every LSSS enjoys the linear
reconstruction property. Denote Π as an LSSS for access
structure A. Let A be an authorized set, and define I ⊆
{1, ..., l} as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ A}. Then the vector (1, 0, ..., 0)
is in the span of rows of matrix M indexed by I , and there
exist constants {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, for any valid shares
{vi} of a secret s according to Π, we have
∑
i∈I wivi = µ.
These constants {wi} can be found in polynomial time with
respect to the size of the share-generating matrix M [33].
Boolean Formulas [31]. Access structures can also be
described in terms of monotonic boolean formulas. LSSS
access structures are more general, and can be derived from
representations as boolean formulas. There are standard
techniques to convert any monotonic boolean formula into
a corresponding LSSS matrix. The boolean formula can
be represented as an access tree, where the interior nodes
are AND and OR gates, and the leaf nodes correspond to
attributes. The number of rows in the corresponding LSSS
matrix will be the same as the number of leaf nodes in the
access tree.
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND SECURITY MOD-
EL
In this section, we describe the system architecture and
the formal definition of ciphertext-policy attribute-based
storage system supporting secure deduplication.
3.1 System Architecture
The architecture of our attribute-based storage system with
secure deduplication is shown in Fig. 2 in which four entities
are involved: data providers, attribute authority (AA), cloud
and users. A data provider wants to outsource his/her data
to the cloud and share it with users possessing certain
credentials. The AA issues every user a decryption key
associated with his/her set of attributes. The cloud consists
of a public cloud which is in charge of data storage and
a private cloud which performs certain computation such
as tag checking. When sending a file storage request, each
data provider firstly creates a tag T and a label L associated
with the data, and then encrypts the data under an access
structure over a set of attributes. Also, each data provider
generates a proof pf on the relationship of the tag T , the
label L and the encrypted message ct3, but this proof will
not be stored anywhere in the cloud and is only used during
the checking phase for any newly generated storage request.
After receiving a storage request, the private cloud first
checks the validity of the proof pf, and then tests the equality
of the new tag T with existing tags in the system. If there
is no match for this new tag T , the private cloud adds the
tag T and the label L to a tag-label list, and forwards the
label and the encrypted data, (L, ct) to the public cloud
for storage. Otherwise, let ct′ be the ciphertext whose tag
matches the new tag and L′ be the label associated with ct′,
and then the private cloud executes as follows.
• If the access policy in ct is a subset of that in ct′,
the private cloud simply discards the new storage
request; else, if the access policy in ct′ is a subset of
that in ct, the private cloud asks the public cloud to
replace the stored pair (L′, ct′) with the new pair (L,
ct) where L = L′.
• If the access policies in ct and ct′ are not mutually
contained, the private cloud runs the ciphertext re-
generation algorithm to yield a new ciphertext for the
same underlying plaintext file and associated with an
access structure which is the union of the two access
3. To keep the notation succinct, we use c to denote the combination
of the encrypted data and the corresponding access structure.
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proc Initialize proc Initialize
cpars← CPG(1λ); b ∈ {0, 1} cpars← CPG(1λ)
Return cpars Return cpars
proc LR(x0, x1) proc Finalize(com, x0, dec0, x1, dec1)
(com, dec)← Com(cpars, xb) d0 ← Ver(cpars, x0, com, dec0)
Return com d1 ← Ver(cpars, x1, com, dec1)
proc Finalize(b′) Return (x0 6= x1 ∧ d0 = 1 ∧ d1 = 1)
Return (b′ = b)
Fig. 1: Game HidingCMT (left) achieves the hiding property and Game BindingCMT (right) achieves the binding property.
Note that LR can only be called once.
structures, and forwards the original label and the
resulting ciphertext to the public cloud.
At the user side, each user can download an item, and
decrypt the ciphertext with the attribute-based private key
generated by the AA if this user’s attribute set satisfies the
access structure. Each user checks the correctness of the
decrypted message using the label, and accepts the message
if it is consistent with the label.
Public Cloud
Private Cloud
Scientist
Life Institute
Cardiologist
General Hospital
Data 
Provider
User
Tag, Label,  
Ciphertext, 
Proof
Access policy
Cardiologist
OR
General Hospital
Scientist
AND
Life Institute
AND
AA
T1 L1
T2 L2
…… ……
File 1
File 2
…….
L1 ct1
L2 ct2
…… ……
Fig. 2: System architecture of attribute-based storage with
secure deduplication.
Concerning the adversarial model of our storage system,
we assume that the private cloud is “curious-but-honest”
such that it will attempt to obtain the encrypted messages
but it will honestly follow the protocols, whereas the public
cloud is distrusted such that it might tamper with the label
and ciphertext pairs outsourced from the private cloud
(note that such a misbehaviour will be detected by either
the private cloud or the user via the accompanied label).
Another difference between the private cloud and the public
cloud is that the former can not collude with users4, but
the latter could collude with users. This assumption is in
line with the real world practice where the private cloud
is trusted more than the public cloud. We assume that
data users may try to access data beyond their authorized
privileges. In addition to trying to obtain plaintext data from
the cloud, malicious outsiders may also commit duplicate
faking attacks as described before.
4. Otherwise, the private cloud can regenerate the ciphertext under
an access policy that an unprivileged user can satisfy, thereby obtaining
the hidden plaintext and breaking the security of the storage system.
3.2 Framework
Our ciphertext-policy attribute-based storage system with
secure deduplication consists of the following algorithms:
setup algorithm Setup, attribute-based private key gen-
eration algorithm KeyGen, encryption algorithm Encrypt,
validity testing algorithm Validity-Test, equality testing al-
gorithm Equality-Test, re-encryption algorithm Re-encrypt
and decryption algorithm Decrypt.
• Setup(1λ) → (pars, msk). Taking the security pa-
rameter λ as the input, this setup algorithm outputs
the public parameter pars and the master private key
msk for the system.
This algorithm is run by the AA.
• KeyGen(pars, msk, A) → skA. Taking the public
parameter pars, the master private key msk and an
attribute set A as the input, this attribute-based pri-
vate key generation algorithm generates an attribute-
based private key skA for the attribute set A.
This algorithm is run by the AA.
• Encrypt(pars, M , A) → (skT , CT). Taking the pub-
lic parameter pars, a message M and an access
structure A over the universe of attributes as the
input, this encryption algorithm outputs a trapdoor
key skT and a tuple CT = (T , L, ct, pf), where T
and L are the tag and the label associated with M
respectively, ct is the ciphertext which includes the
encryption of M as well as the access structure A,
and pf is a proof on the relationship of tag T , label L
and ciphertext ct.
This algorithm is run by the data provider. Both skT
and CT are forwarded to the private cloud. Note that
skT can not be disclosed to any third party, so it must
be sent to the private cloud in a secure manner.
• Validity-Test(pars, CT) → 1/0. Taking the public
parameter pars and a tuple CT as the input, this
validity testing algorithm parses CT as (T , L, ct, pf),
and outputs 1 if pf is a valid proof for (T , L, ct) or 0
otherwise.
This algorithm is run by the private cloud.
• Equality-Test(pars, (T1, L1, ct1), (T2, L2, ct2)) →
1/0. Taking the public parameter pars and two tu-
ples (T1, L1, ct1) and (T2, L2, ct2) as the input,
this equality testing algorithm outputs 1 if both (T1,
L1, ct1), (T2, L2, ct2) are generated from the same
underlying message or 0 otherwise.
This algorithm is run by the private cloud.
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• Re-encrypt(pars, skT , (L, ct), A′)→ (L, ct′). Taking
the public parameter pars, the trapdoor key skT , a
tag and ciphertext pair (L, ct) and an access structure
A′ as the input, this re-encryption algorithm outputs
a new ciphertext ct′ associated with A′ sharing the
same label L of the ciphertext ct′.
This algorithm is run by the private cloud.
• Decrypt(pars, (L, ct), A, skA) → M/⊥. Taking the
public parameter pars, a label and ciphertext pair
(L, ct) and an attribute-based private key skA associ-
ated to an attribute set A as the input, this decryption
algorithm outputs either the message M when the
private key skA satisfies the access structure of the
ciphertext ct and the label L is consistent with M (to
be defined later), or a symbol⊥ indicating the failure
of the decryption.
This algorithm is run by the user.
We require that a ciphertext-policy attribute-based stor-
age system with secure deduplication Π is correct, meaning
that the decryption algorithm correctly decrypts a ciphertext
of an access structure A with an attribute-based private key
on A, when A is an authorized set of A. Formally, for all
messages M , and all attribute sets A and access structures A
with authorized A satisfying A, if (pars, msk)← Setup(1λ),
skA ← KeyGen(pars, msk, A), (skT , CT)← Encrypt(pars,
M , A), 1 ← Validity-Test(pars, CT), then Decrypt(pars,
(L, ct), A, skA) = M . Additionally, for all messages M ,
we require that if (skT , CT) ← Encrypt(pars, M , A), 1 ←
Validity-Test(pars, CT), and (sk′T , CT
′)← Encrypt(pars,M ,
A′), 1 ← Validity-Test(pars, CT′), then Equality-Test(pars,
(T , L, ct), (T ′, L′, ct′)) = 1.
Notice that with respect to a concrete construction, the
input A of the encryption algorithm Encrypt will be set to
be the corresponding policy (M, ρ).
3.3 Security Definitions
Traditionally, an encryption system is required to provide
privacy of the encrypted data, which is captured by indis-
tinguishability under either chosen plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA) or chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). However,
neither IND-CPA nor IND-CCA is feasible in an encrypted
storage system with secure deduplication, since it can be
easily broken by an adversary in either IND-CPA or IND-
CCA security game as follows. An adversary, given a chal-
lenge CT∗ for a plaintext mb with b ∈ {0, 1} where m0,
m1 are chosen by the adversary, can output the correct b by
creating a tag T for mb and running the equality testing
algorithm to see whether T matches the tag T ∗ of CT∗.
Noticeably, it is impossible to design an encryption scheme
with an equality-checking tag to satisfy the standard notions
of confidentiality [9]. Thus, we alternatively aim to achieve
IND-CPA security at the public cloud side, whilst preserving
a security notion called PRV-CDA security (privacy under
chosen distribution attacks) [8] at the private cloud side
under the assumption that the message space M(λ) is
sufficiently large such that the plaintexts in the system are
unpredictable (i.e., given the public parameter and encryp-
tion of a randomly selected plaintext in the message space
M(λ), it is infeasible for any polynominal time algorithm A
to obtain the plaintext).
IND-CPA Security. Denote our attribute-based storage
system with secure deduplication Π. The definition of se-
lective IND-CPA security with respect to the public cloud
in Π is given in Fig. 3, where we restrain algorithm A to
issuing queries to the key generation oracle on attribute sets
satisfying the access structures A0 and A1.
An attribute-based storage system with secure dedu-
plication Π is IND-CPA secure if the advantage function
referring to the security game GameINDΠ,A
AdvINDΠ,A(λ)
def
= Pr[b′ = b]
is negligible in the security parameter λ for any probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversary algorithm A.
PRV-CDA Security. Based on the definition of PRV-CDA
given in [8], the definition of PRV-CDA for Π is shown in
Fig. 3, where the adversary is given an additional trapdoor
key for the challenge ciphertext but is not given access to
any attribute-based private keys (as the private cloud is not
allowed to collude with users).
An attribute-based storage system with secure dedu-
plication Π is PRV-CDA secure if the advantage function
referring to the security game GamePRVΠ,A
AdvPRV-CDAΠ,A (λ)
def
= Pr[b′ = b]
is negligible in the security parameter λ for any PPT adver-
sary algorithm A.
With regard to a storage system, it is crucial to ensure
consistency [9] to resist duplicate faking attacks such that a
legitimate message will not be unnoticeably replaced by a
fake one. Consistency in our attribute-based storage system
with secure deduplication can be divided into ciphertext
consistency, tag and label consistency. Ciphertext consis-
tency guarantees that given a ciphertext outsourced by an
honest data provider, an adversary who has no idea about
the encrypted data can not generate another valid ciphertext
with the same tag but under a different plaintext to cheat the
private cloud. Tag/Label consistency ensures consistency of
the data used in the tag/label derivation and the ciphertext
generation such that an adversary is not able to create a
tag/label that does not match the underlying data to cheat
a user having access to the encrypted data.
Consistency. Ciphertext consistency for our attribute-
based storage system with secure deduplication Π is given
in Fig. 4, in which given a ciphertext (T , L, ct, pf ) and the
public parameter, an adversary wins the game if it outputs
another ciphertext (T , L′, ct′, pf ′) such that pf ′ is valid for
(T , L′, ct′). This game prevents an adversary from capturing
an outsourcing request from an honest data provider and
replacing the corresponding ciphertext to another cipher-
text without being detected by the private cloud. Taking
the definition for consistency in [9] into consideration, we
depict the security game for tag/label consistency for our
system Π in Fig. 4, which provides security against duplicate
faking attacks where a legitimate message is replaced by
a fake one without being discovered. Specifically, assume
that an adversary creates and uploads a ciphertext ct′ of
M ′ associated with a tag and label pair for M . Later, an
honest data provider, holding M computes and uploads the
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Security game for selective IND-CPA: Security game for PRV-CDA:
GameINDΠ,A Game
PRV
Π,A
(pars, msk)← Setup(1λ); b← {0, 1} (pars, msk)← Setup(1λ)
(st, A0, A1, M0, M1)←AKeyGenmsk(·)(pars) (M∗0 , M∗1 )←M(λ)
(skT , CT)← Encrypt(pars, Mb, A0) (st, A∗)←A(pars)
(L, ct∗)← Re-encrypt(pars, skT , (L, ct), A1) (sk∗T , CT∗)← Encrypt(pars, M∗b , A∗)
b′ ←AKeyGenmsk(·)(pars, st, M0, M1, (L, ct∗)) b′ ←A(pars, st, sk∗T , CT∗)
Return b′ = b Return b′ = b
Fig. 3: Security game for selective IND-CPA (left) and PRV-CDA (right), where st is information collected by the adversary.
Ciphertext-Consistency security Tag (or Label)-Consistency security
game: GameCCΠ,A game: Game
TC (or LC)
Π,A
pars← Setup(1λ) pars← Setup(1λ)
CT← Encrypt(pars, M , A) (M , CT)←A(pars)
CT′ ←A(pars, CT) If M = ⊥ or CT = ⊥ Return false
M ′ ← Decrypt(pars, (L′, ct′), A, skA) M ′ ← Decrypt(pars, (L′, ct′), A, skA)
If 1← Validity-Test(pars, CT′) CT′ ← Encrypt(pars, M , A)
∧ (M 6= M ′) ∧ (CT ∩ CT′ = T ) If 1← Equality-Test(pars, (L, T , ct), (L′, T ′, ct′))
Return true ∧ (M 6= M ′)
Return true
Fig. 4: Security games for consistency.
encryption ct of M . Since the tags of ct and ct′ are equal, the
private cloud continues to ask the public cloud to store only
ct′. Later, the honest data provider, who expects to recover
M , downloads and decrypts ct′, but it obtains M ′ instead of
M . In addition, the duplicate faking attacks can occur when
an adversary tampers with the label and ciphertext pairs
stored in the public cloud by modifying (L, ct) to (L′, ct′).
Note that any misbehaviour to the label in the public cloud
will be easily spotted by the private cloud due to that each
label is stored in both public and private clouds, and thus
the tampering to the ciphertext will be found by those who
can decrypt it via checking whether the label derived from
the decryption matches the given label.
An attribute-based storage system for secure deduplica-
tion is consistent if the advantage function referring to the
security game GameXCΠ,A for XC ∈ {CC, TC, LC}
AdvXCΠ,A(λ)
def
= Pr[GameXCΠ,A ⇒ true]
is negligible in the security parameter λ for any PPT adver-
sary algorithm A.
4 ATTRIBUTE-BASED STORAGE WITH SECURE D-
EDUPLICATION
In this section, we describe a concrete construction of an
attribute-based storage system supporting secure dedupli-
cation, analyze its security, and show its performance from
theoretical and experimental analysis.
4.1 Construction
Let SE = (SE .Enc, SE .Dec) be a symmetric encryption
scheme with a message space M and a key space K. On
the basis of the large universe CP-ABE scheme proposed
in [22], below we present an attribute-based storage system
with secure deduplication.
• Setup. This algorithm takes the security parameter
λ as the input. It randomly chooses a group G of
a prime order p with a generator g, and a bilinear
pairing eˆ : G × G → G1. Then, it randomly chooses
collision resistant hash functions f0 : G1 → Zp, f1 :
M → Zp, F : G1 → K, H : G5 → Zp. Also, it
randomly chooses α ∈ Z∗p , u, h, v, w ∈ G. The
public parameter is pars = (f0, f1, F , H , g, u, h,
w, v, eˆ(g, g)α), and the master private key is msk =
gα.
• KeyGen. This algorithm takes the public parameter
pars, the master private key msk and a set A =
{A1, ..., A|A|} of attributes as the input. It randomly
chooses r, r1, ..., r|A| ∈ Z∗p , and computes
sk′1 = g
αwr, sk′2 = g
r,
∀i ∈ A sk(i)2 = gri , sk(i)1 = (uAih)riv−r.
It outputs the attribute-based private key skA = (sk′1,
{sk(i)1 }i∈A, sk′2, {sk(i)2 }i∈A) associated with a set of
attributes A.
• Encrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter
pars, a message M ∈ M and an LSSS access struc-
ture (M, ρ) where ρ is a function which associates
the rows of M to attributes as the input. Let M be
an l × n matrix. It randomly chooses a vector −→v =
(µ5, y2, ..., yn) ∈ Znp , of which the values will be
used to share the encryption exponent µ. For i =
1, ..., l, it calculates vi = −→v · Mi, where Mi is the
vector corresponding to the i-th row of the matrix
5. In addition, if µ is set to be H(β,M) where H is a hash function
mapping the input to an element from Z∗p , then the proposed scheme
can achieve the IND-CCA security in the random oracle model, which is
the generic transformation technology from IND-CPA security to IND-
CCA security proposed in [30].
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M. In addition, it randomly chooses β ∈ G1, z1, ...,
zl ∈ Zp, and computes
U = gf(M)µ, L = gf1(M)hf0(β),
E = SE .Enc(F (β),M)
B = gµ, C = β · eˆ(g, g)αµ,
∀i ∈ [1, l] Ci = wvivzi , Di = gzi , Ei = (uρ(i)h)−zi ,
PoK{(M,β) : U = Bf(M) ∧ L = gf1(M)hf0(β)}.
It outputs a trapdoor key skT = wµ, and a tuple of
tag, label, ciphertext and proof CT = (T , L, ct, pf)
where T = (U , B), ct =
(
(M, ρ), E, B, C , {(Ci,
Di, Ei)}i∈[1,l]
)
, and pf is a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge (PoK) for the equality of µ in U , B and
f(M) in U , Lwithout leaking the values of µ,M and
β. Here PoK is a zero-knowledge proof composed of
(U , B, L, θ1, θ2) and can be computed as follows. It
randomly chooses d1, d2 ∈ Z∗p , and computes
R1 = B
d1 , R2 = g
d1hd2 , c = H(U,B,L,R1, R2),
θ1 = d1 − c · f1(M), θ2 = d2 − c · f0(β).
Note that according to the binding property of the
commitment scheme [14], each L can only be ob-
tained from a unique pair of M and β, which guar-
antee the consistency of the ciphertext stored by the
public cloud.
• Validity-Test. This algorithm takes the public param-
eter pars and a ciphertext CT as the input. To test the
validity of the ciphertext, it computes
R1 = U
cBθ1 , R2 = L
cgθ1hθ2 .
If c = H(U,B,L,R1, R2), it accepts CT, and stores(
L, ((M, ρ), E, B, C, {Ci, Di, Ei}i∈[1,l]))
)
to the
public cloud. Otherwise, it rejects CT.
• Equality-Test. This algorithm takes the public param-
eter pars and two tags (U1, B1) and (U2, B2) of the
outsourced data as input. It outputs 1 if eˆ(U1, B2) =
eˆ(U2, B1). Otherwise, it outputs 0.
• Re-encrypt. This algorithm takes the public parame-
ter pars, a trapdoor key skT , a ciphertext
(
(M, ρ),
E, B, C, {(Ci, Di, Ei)}
)
with a label L and an
LSSS access structure (M′, ρ′) where the function ρ′
associates the rows of M′ to attributes as the input.
Let M′ be an l′×n′ matrix. It randomly chooses −→¯v =
(µ¯, y¯′2, ..., y¯
′
n′) ∈ Zn
′
p . For each row M′i′ = (m′i′1, ...,
m′i′n′) of M′ where i′ ∈ [1, l′], it randomly chooses
z′i′ ∈ Zp. Let −→v ′ = (µ′, y¯′2, ..., y¯′n′) for µ′ = µ+ µ¯. For
i′ ∈ [1, l′], it outputs the new ciphertext as
B′ = B · gµ¯, L′ = L, E′ = E, C ′ = C · eˆ(g, g)αµ¯,
C ′i′ = w
M′
i′
−→v ′vz
′
i′ , D′i′ = g
z′
i′ , E′i′ = (u
ρ′(i′)h)−z
′
i′ ,
where C ′i′ can be computed as follows without
knowing the values of µ and µ˜.
C ′i′ = w
M′
i′
−→v ′vz
′
i′ = w(µ
′m′
i′1+...+y
′
nm
′
i′n′ )vz
′
i
= wµm
′
i1w(µ¯m
′
i′1+...+y¯
′
nm
′
i′n′ )vz
′
i′ .
It is straightforward to see that the distribution of(
L′, ((M′, ρ′), E′, B′, C ′, {C ′i, D′i, E′i}i′∈[1,l′])
)
is
consistent with that outputted by the encryption
algorithm Encrypt(pars, M , (M′, ρ′)).
• Decrypt. This algorithm takes the public parame-
ter pars, a ciphertext
(
(M, ρ), E, B, C, {Ci, Di,
Ei}i∈[1,l]
)
with the corresponding label L and a
private key skA for an attribute set A as the input.
Suppose that an attribute set A satisfies the access
structure (M, ρ). Define I as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ A}.
Denote by {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I a set of constants such that
if {vi} are valid shares of any secret µ according to
(M, ρ), then
∑
i∈I wivi = µ. It computes the message
M as
eˆ(B, sk′1)∏
i∈I(eˆ(Ci, sk
′
2)eˆ(Di, sk
(i)
1 )eˆ(Ei, sk
(i)
2 ))
wi
=
eˆ(g, g)αµeˆ(g, w)µr∏
i∈I eˆ(g, w)rviwi
= eˆ(g, g)αµ,
and cancels out eˆ(g, g)αµ from C to obtain β. Then,
it computes M = SE .Dec(F (β), E). If gf1(M)hf0(β)
= L, it outputs M . Otherwise, it outputs a failure
symbol ⊥.
Correctness. The correctness for the decryption algorith-
m follows that of the original attribute-based encryption
scheme in [22]. The correctness for the validity testing algo-
rithm relies on the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge sys-
tem PoK, which is straightforward. The correct of equality
testing algorithm is guaranteed by the properties of groups
equipped with bilinear maps. If T1 = (U1, B1) and T2 =
(U2, B2) are created by the encryption scheme on the same
underlying message M , then
eˆ(U1, B2) = eˆ(g
f1(M)µ1 , gµ2) = eˆ(g, g)f1(M)µ1µ2 ,
eˆ(U2, B1) = eˆ(g
f1(M)µ2 , gµ1) = eˆ(g, g)f1(M)µ1µ2 .
Thus, eˆ(U1, B2) = eˆ(U2, B1) as required.
Remarks. Note that a similar idea for ciphertext regener-
ation has been put forward by Lai et al. [34], but in their
method, the trapdoor key is created by the AA and can
be used to transform any ciphertext over one access policy
into those ciphertexts of an identical plaintext under other
access policies. Whereas in our system, we resort to a one
(trapdoor key) to one (ciphertext) framework such that even
one trapdoor key is compromised, the system is still secure
for other ciphertexts.
4.2 Security
We begin with proving the security of the zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge used in the proposed construction,
which plays an important role in proving the security of
the proposed storage system.
Lemma 1. The PoK is a secure zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge system of witness (M , β).
Proof. Since the completeness of PoK is straightforward, we
focus on its soundness and zero-knowledge.
Soundness. Assume there are two transcripts with the
same (U , L) but different challenges c′, c and different
responses (θ′1, θ
′
2) and (θ1, θ2).
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Then (µ, M) can be extracted from
U = Bf1(M) = B
θ′1−θ1
c−c′ ,
L = gf1(M)hf0(β) = g
θ′1−θ1
c−c′ h
θ′2−θ2
c−c′ .
Zero-knowledge. The simulator randomly chooses θ1, θ2 ∈
Z∗p , c ∈ Z∗p , and computes
R1 = U
cBθ1 , R2 = L
cgθ1hθ2 .
Then it sets c = H(U,B,L,R1, R2).
Next, we prove that the proposed storage system pre-
serves the privacy of the encrypted data in terms of public
cloud and private cloud, respectively.
Theorem 1. Assuming that the (q − 1) assumption holds
in G, SE is a secure symmetric encryption scheme and L
is generated following a secure commitment scheme, then
the proposed attribute-based storage system with secure
deduplication is selectively indistinguishable regarding the
view of the public cloud.
Proof. The Rouselakis-Waters scheme [22] is known to be
selectively indistinguishable assuming that the (q − 1) as-
sumption holds in G. Our proof for Theorem 1 mostly fol-
lows that in [22] except that in the challenge phase, E∗ and
L∗ = gf1(M
∗
b )hf0(β) will be added to the original challenge
ciphertext. Note that E∗ will not disclose any information
about M∗b due to the security of the underlying SE scheme,
and L∗ will not tell any information about M∗b due to the
security of the underlying commitment scheme.
Theorem 2. Assuming that the decisional (q−1) assumption
holds inG, the decisional BDH assumption holds inG, SE is
a secure symmetric encryption scheme and PoK is a secure
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, then the proposed
attribute-based storage system with secure deduplication is
PRV-CDA secure.
Proof. The PRV-CDA security is composed of the security
of encryption (adversary A1) and re-encryption (adversary
A2) algorithms. The security against the adversary algorith-
mA1 is twofold: the ciphertext and the proof. In terms of the
ciphertext, the proof follows that in [22] except that in the
challenge phase, E∗ and L∗ (computed as that in Theorem
1) will be added to the challenge ciphertext. Concerning
the proof, due to the property of zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge, it discloses no information about M∗b .
Below we describe the security proof for the adversary
algorithm A2 under the decisional BDH assumption. Sup-
pose that there exists an adversary algorithmA2 that breaks
the PRV-CDA security of our system. Then we can build
a challenger algorithm B that solves the decisional BDH
problem. Algorithm B is given (g, ga, gb, gc, Z), and its
goal is to output 1 if Z = eˆ(g, g)abc and 0 if Z is uniform in
GT .
Algorithm B randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p , u, h, v ∈ G, and
computes w = gx. It sets the public parameter as pars = (f ,
H , g, u, h, w, v, eˆ(ga, gb)) where f , H are collision resistant
hash functions. This implies that the master private key α =
ab is unknown to algorithm B.
When algorithm A2 outputs an access structure (M∗,
ρ∗), algorithm B firstly chooses a plaintext M∗b ∈ {M∗0 ,M∗1 }
(b ∈ {0, 1}) from the message space, and then it randomly
chooses c˜, y2, ..., yn ∈ Zp, and sets −→v = (c, y2, ..., yn),−→˜
v = (c˜, y2, ..., yn). Also, algorithm B randomly chooses
β ∈ G1, z1, ..., zl ∈ Zp. It outputs the trapdoor key, tag and
ciphertext tuple as
sk∗T = w
c = (gc)x, L∗ = gf1(M
∗
b )hf0(β),
E∗ = SE .Enc(F (β),M∗b ),
B∗ = gc, C∗ = β∗ · Z, B˜∗ = gc˜, C˜∗ = β · Z,
C∗i = w
M∗i−→v vzi , D∗1 = g
zi , E∗i = (u
ρ∗(i)h)−zi ,
where for i ∈ [1, l], C∗i can be computed as follows without
knowing the value of c.
C∗i = w
M∗i−→v vzi = w(cm
∗
i1+...+ynm
∗
in)vzi
= (wc)m
∗
i1w(y2m
∗
i2+...+ynm
∗
in)vzi
= (gc)xm
∗
i1w(y2m
∗
i2+...+ynm
∗
in)vzi .
Since Z = eˆ(g, g)abc = eˆ(ga, gb)c, it is straightforward that
the distribution of
(
L∗, ((M∗, ρ∗), E∗, B∗, C∗, {C∗i , D∗i ,
E∗i })
)
and sk∗T are the same as the input of the re-encryption
algorithm in the view of algorithm A2.
Finally, algorithm A2 outputs a guess b′. If b′ = b,
algorithm B outputs 1 meaning Z = eˆ(g, g)abc. Otherwise,
it outputs 0.
When Z = eˆ(g, g)abc, E∗ is created using a secure SE
scheme, and L∗ is generated using a secure commitment
scheme, the perspective of algorithm A2 is the same as
that in the real game. When Z is uniform in GT , E∗ and
L∗ are randomly generated, the value of b is information-
theoretically hidden from algorithm A2. Therefore, if algo-
rithmA2 breaks the PRV-CDA security of the above scheme,
algorithm B solves the decisional BDH problem, or breaks
the security of the underlying SE scheme, or breaks the
security of the commitment scheme.
Finally, we prove that the proposed storage system sup-
ports secure deduplication.
Theorem 3. Assume that PoK is a secure zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge and L is generated following a secure
commitment scheme. Then the attribute-based storage sys-
tem with secure deduplication is consistent.
Proof. Based on the property of zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge, it is straightforward to see that our attribute-
based storage system for secure deduplication is ciphertext
consistent. Thus, it remains to prove that the system is tag
consistent. The tag L in our scheme is constructed using a
commitment scheme [14]. Thus, if an adversary breaks the
tag consistency of the above system, then this adversary can
be used to break the security for the underlying commit-
ment scheme of which the security has been analyzed in
[14].
4.3 Performance Evaluation
Recall that our attribute-based storage system is built up-
on the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme
proposed by Rouselakis and Waters [22] which could not
resist duplication behaviours. Let |pars|, |msk|, |ct|, |L|, |T |,
|sk|, |A| be the sizes of the public parameter, the master
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TABLE 1: Comparison of storage complexity between the based scheme [22] and our storage system.
System System Public Cloud Private Cloud User
public master label and tag and private
parameter private key ciphertext label key
|pars| |msk| |ct|+ |L| |T |+ |L| |sk|
CP-ABE [22] 6 1 3l + 2 + |A| − 2k + 2
The proposed storage system 10 1 3l + 5 + |A| 3 2k + 2
private key, the ciphertext, the label, the tag, the decryption
key and the access structure, respectively. Denote l by the
number of attributes in an access structure, and k by the
size of an attribute set ascribed to a user’s credentials.
Table 1 compares the storage complexity of our system
with that in [22]. It is clear that our system is efficient in
terms of the introduced storage overhead, which adds the
underlying CP-ABE scheme [22] 4 elements to the system
public parameter and 3 element to the ciphertext stored by
the public cloud, with an additional private cloud storing 3
elements.
Let l be the number of attributes presented in an access
structure, and k be the size of an attribute set associated
with the private key. Denote y by the number of existing
tags stored by the private cloud. Table 2 shows the number
of exponential and paring operations in our storage system.
For example, it requires at most k + 2 exponential opera-
tions and 3k + 1 paring operations to decrypt a ciphertext.
Table 3 compares the computational costs incurred at the
data provider, the cloud, and the user for one file storage
between the system in [22] and our system. It is not difficult
to see that the computational requirement for the user in
our system is almost twice that in the underlying CP-ABE
scheme in [22]. With regard to the data provider, it requires
4 extra exponential operations resulted from the tag, label,
proof and trapdoor key in addition to the computational
cost of the underlying scheme in [22] lacking the capability
of secure deduplication. In terms of the private cloud, our
solution takes 5 + (6l + 2) exponential operations and 2y
pairing operations, among which 5 exponential operations
are used to check the validity of the proof, 6l+2 exponential
operations are related to the ciphertext regeneration if nec-
essary6 and 2y pairing operations are calculated to check
whether the plaintext hidden in the outsourcing request has
existed in the public cloud.
TABLE 3: Comparison of computational costs between the
underlying scheme [22] and our storage system.
Data Private User
Provider Cloud
CP-ABE [22] Expo 5l + 2 − ≤ k
Pairing 0 − ≤ 3k + 1
Our storage Expo 5l + 6 5 + (6l + 2) ≤ k + 2
system Pairing 0 2y ≤ 3k + 1
4.4 Implementation
We implement the algorithms of our storage system in
Charm [35]7, which is a framework developed to facilitate
6. Recall that ciphertext regeneration is only executed when the
access structures associated with the incoming and existing ciphertexts
are not mutually compatible.
7. For the explicit information on Charm, please refer to [35].
rapid prototyping of cryptographic schemes and protocols.
Since all Charm routines are designed under the asymmetric
groups, our construction is transformed to the asymmetric
setting before the implementation. That is, three groups G,
Gˆ and G1 are used and the pairing eˆ is a function from
G × Gˆ to G1. Notice that it has been stated in [22] that the
assumptions and the security proofs can be converted to the
asymmetric setting in a generic way. We use the Charm-0.43
and the Python 3.4 in our implementation. Along with the
Charm-0.43, we install the PBC library for the underlying
cryptographic operations. Our experiments are run on a
laptop with Intel Core i5-4210U CPU @ 1.70GHz and 4.00
GB RAM running 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04.
We simulate the proposed attribute-based storage sys-
tem with secure deduplication over four different ellip-
tic curves: SS512, MNT159, MNT201 and MNT224, where
SS512 is a supersingular elliptic curve with the symmetric
Type 1 pairing on it, and the pairings on the other three
curves are asymmetric Type 3 pairings. These four curves
provide the security level of 80-bit, 80-bit, 100-bit and 112-
bit, respectively. Fig. 5 shows the computation complexity
of the proposed attribute-based storage system supporting
secure deduplication in terms of four algorithms: key gen-
eration algorithm KeyGen (Fig. 5-(a)), encryption algorith-
m Encrypt (Fig. 5-(b)), re-encryption algorithm Re-encrypt
(Fig. 5-(c)) and decryption algorithm Decrypt (Fig. 5-(d)).
As illustrated in Fig. 5, SS512 has the best performance,
while MNT224 has the most expensive computational cost
among all the curves. For each curve, the average compu-
tation time of key generation increases linearly with the
size of attributes set whilst the average computation time
of encryption and re-encryption grows linearly with the
complexity of the access policy. In terms of the four curves
used in our experiments, the average computation time
of decrypting a ciphertext ranges from 1.60s to 5.80s for
a ciphertext with 100 attributes using a private key with
100 attributes. Clearly, the proposed attribute-based storage
system with secure deduplication is sufficiently efficient to
be applied in practice.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide further elaboration on the two
main techniques we introduced in this paper.
5.1 Adaptable Attribute-Based Encryption
Lai et al. [34] presented a cryptographic primitive called
adaptable CP-ABE, where a semi-trusted proxy is intro-
duced into the setting of CP-ABE. The proxy, given a system
wide trapdoor key, is able to transform any ciphertext under
one access policy into ciphertexts of the same plaintext
2332-7790 (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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TABLE 2: Computational overheads in our storage system.
Tag La- Encry- Proof Trap- Re-en- Vali- Equa- De-
bel pt door key crypt dity lity crypt
Expo 2 2 5l + 1 3 1 6l + 2 5 0 ≤ k + 2
Pairing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2y ≤ 3k + 1
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Fig. 5: Performance of our attribute-based storage system supporting secure deduplication.
under any other access policies without learning any in-
formation about the plaintext during the process of trans-
formation. However, this method of using a single trapdoor
key for all ciphertexts is quite risky, since if the single key is
compromised, the security for the system will be totally bro-
ken. An adversarial user using the compromised trapdoor
key can regenerate a ciphertext into an access structure that
his/her attributes satisfy, and thus he/she can obtain the
plaintext not intended for him/her. Besides, the trapdoor
key in [34] is generated by the AA who already controls the
decryption keys in the system, so it is desirable to reduce
its power in manipulating the encryption. Unlike that in
[34], our technique is one-to-one such that each trapdoor key
can only be used to transform its corresponding ciphertext.
Therefore, even at some point, a trapdoor key is comprised,
the damage is limited to one message. At a high level, our
technique brings another way to build adaptive CP-ABE
systems from a different point of view.
5.2 Deduplication in Hybrid Cloud
An inherent drawback of the existing approaches to achieve
secure deduplication (e.g., [8], [23]) is that they cannot sat-
isfy the standard security definition for confidentiality such
as semantic security (See Section 3.3 for the reason). To solve
this problem, a weaker security notion called privacy under
chosen-distribution attacks [8] was put forward under the
assumption that the input message is sufficiently unpre-
dictable. Different from the existing method of defining a
weaker security notion for the cloud storage system with
secure deduplication, a hybrid cloud architecture, consisting
of a pair of public and private clouds, is introduced in
our storage system such that the semantic security becomes
achievable for the public cloud. This framework of twin
clouds has been widely adopted in practice, where the se-
curity of the public cloud usually confronts more challenges
than that of the private cloud, and hence it is desirable to
have stronger data confidentiality protection at the public
cloud side. We believe that the hybrid cloud architecture is a
promising approach to storage systems with deduplication,
2332-7790 (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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in which the encrypted data is outsourced to the public
cloud whilst the deduplication checking is handled by the
private cloud.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been widely used
in cloud computing where data providers outsource their
encrypted data to the cloud and can share the data with
users possessing specified credentials. On the other hand,
deduplication is an important technique to save the storage
space and network bandwidth, which eliminates duplicate
copies of identical data. However, the standard ABE systems
do not support secure deduplication, which makes them
costly to be applied in some commercial storage services.
In this paper, we presented a novel approach to realize an
attribute-based storage system supporting secure dedupli-
cation. Our storage system is built under a hybrid cloud
architecture, where a private cloud manipulates the compu-
tation and a public cloud manages the storage. The private
cloud is provided with a trapdoor key associated with the
corresponding ciphertext, with which it can transfer the
ciphertext over one access policy into ciphertexts of the same
plaintext under any other access policies without being
aware of the underlying plaintext. After receiving a storage
request, the private cloud first checks the validity of the
uploaded item through the attached proof. If the proof is
valid, the private cloud runs a tag matching algorithm to
see whether the same data underlying the ciphertext has
been stored. If so, whenever it is necessary, it regenerates
the ciphertext into a ciphertext of the same plaintext over an
access policy which is the union set of both access policies.
The proposed storage system enjoys two major advantages.
Firstly, it can be used to confidentially share data with other
users by specifying an access policy rather than sharing the
decryption key. Secondly, it achieves the standard notion
of semantic security while existing deduplication schemes
only achieve it under a weaker security notion.
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